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Sin, grace, and the redemption of suffering 
David Albert Jones 
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the (Roman) Catholic account of the relationship 
between sin and suffering provided by JLA Garcia in ‘Sin and Suffering in a Catholic 
Understanding of medical ethics’. Garcia’s paper of falls into two parts: the first 
draws on Thomas Aquinas to outlines a natural law/virtue approach to ethics and 
places sin and vice in that context; the second contains a criticism of views of public 
health that omit consideration of sin and vice, and then, following Pope John Paul II, 
sets out some ways in which suffering can be put to a good use.  
 
The paper contains interesting material and contributes to the theological 
understanding of this area. It draws on the Catholic tradition and particularly on the 
thought of Thomas Aquinas who remains an important resource for Catholic theology. 
Nevertheless, there are also features which are open to criticism, both in terms of 
omissions and in terms of positive claims. The following criticism is intended to be 
constructive, drawing out points of agreement and showing how the account could be 
further strengthened by the remedying of omissions and of certain mistakes. 
 
Garcia on Thomas on law 
 
Garcia begins with a definition of sin given by Saint Augustine, used by Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, and quoted, with approval, by the 1994 Catechism of the Catholic 
Church: sin is an ‘utterance, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law’1. However, 
before returning to the notion of law, Garcia sketches out what he regards as the core 
of Christian morality: It is ‘not chiefly a matter of “Thou Shalt Nots”… but more 
positively of living a vocation… controlling our passions, under the operations of 
reason that we call conscience, so as to live virtuously’ (Garcia, p. 4). This is a theme 
to which Garcia returns at several places in his paper. The struggle with sin, however 
important, is not the centre or the starting point of moral action. The starting point is 
good and virtuous behaviour which aims at human fulfilment. ‘The virtuous life is 
self-fulfilment; living morally both fulfils our natures in our most fundamental needs 
and wants’ (Garcia, p. 4). For his positive account of the virtues Garcia gives draws 
heavily on Thomas Aquinas2 and, in particular, on certain sections of the Summa 
Theologiae. Hence also it is to Thomas Aquinas that Garcia looks for his account of 
sin, and of law, for sin is a transgression of the law. 
 
According to Garcia, Thomas Aquinas considers law under four headings: (1) eternal 
law, (2) natural law, (3) human law and (4) divine law3.  
 
(1) The eternal law is nothing less that Providence, ‘God’s benevolent ordering of 
Creation’ (Garcia, p. 5). The eternal law is thus the creative plan of the eternal God.  
 
(2) Human beings, having the natural powers of reason and free will share in this 
divine ordering of creation by means of their good actions. The participation in the 
eternal law of God is what Thomas calls ‘natural law’. Natural law is not a complete 
set of human laws in heaven (as it were) but rather it is the basis, in human nature and 
human reason, for measuring the justice and reasonableness of human actions.  
 
(3) Human law is the positive law that is laid down by human lawmakers, for the sake 
of the common good. To be valid, these human laws must be based on the principles 
of natural law, though lawmakers have some latitude for positively determining the 
particular form that a law takes. For example, the natural law might imply that there 
should be reasonable speed limits, but the laying down of precise speed limits for 
particular areas and the level of fine for breaking the limit, depends also on creative 
human choice. 
 
(4) Lastly, there is divine law, the law given by God to the human race by revelation, 
and codified on Mount Sinai. According to Garcia, this divine law is like the 
‘instruction manual provided with some complicated new device’ (Garcia, p. 6). Now 
the reason that it is good for the apparatus to keep it clean etc. is not simply because it 
says so in the instruction manual but because of the inherent properties of the 
machinery. The manual says that these things should be done because they are in fact 
good for the device. Thus, in effect, Garcia answers Euthyphro4 by saying that the 
commandments of God are good because they reflect the nature of human beings, not 
simply because they are from God. ‘Likewise, in Aquinas’ authoritative conception, it 
is not the Decalogue that makes parental dishonour, manslaughter, theft, adultery etc. 
to be immoral. That is already fixed by the nature of human beings, their natural 
needs and welfare’5. 
 
Garcia asserts that the authority of the lawgiver is not based on power but on the fact 
that ‘she has been entrusted with the community’s custody’ and ‘is answerable for the 
community’s well-being’ (Garcia, p. 7). Thus, the authority of the lawgiver is based 
on his or her obligation to promote the common good: ‘rights emerge from prior 
duties’ (Garcia, p. 9). Garcia then states that ‘we can best understand God’s 
commands and thus sin on a similar model’ (Garcia, p. 9). What he has in mind is the 
putative basis of the commandments of the divine law in the natural law, as directed 
to the good of individual human persons and to the community. 
 
Thomas on the divine law 
 
At this juncture it is necessary to assess the accuracy of Garcia’s account of Thomas. 
This is not only a question of the interpretation of one theologian, for if elements of 
Thomas’s thought have been significantly misunderstood this might well involve the 
misunderstanding important theological truths.  
 
Let us begin with Garcia’s account of the authority of a lawgiver. There are obvious 
theological problems with the application of this to the divine lawgiver. Is it really the 
case that God is answerable for the community’s well-being or has prior duties to his 
creatures? This conception of the creator does not sit well either with the Scriptures or 
with the Catholic tradition. Surely, it is one of the themes of the book of Job that God 
is not answerable to human beings (Job 38.1-42.6). It is also the teaching of Thomas 
Aquinas that God is not bound by obligations to any creature (S.T. 1a, q. 21, art 1, ad. 
3, S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 114, art. 1). In the words of Herbert McCabe (2005: 37), ‘there can 
be no sense in the idea that God has any job or is under any obligation; if he were, 
there would be something greater than God which constrained him’.   
 
This apparent characterisation of God as a moral agent, under obligations to the 
community6 is indicative of a general theological weakness in Garcia’s paper. In his 
introduction Garcia states that the fact that his ‘education and writing are 
philosophical, not theological’, is an ‘advantage’ (Garcia, p. 3) for the construction of 
a Catholic account of sin and suffering. However, it is strange to portray a lack of 
familiarity with any academic discipline (in this case, theology) as an advantage for 
writing within that discipline. It seems, in fact, that Garcia falls into a number of 
mistakes in the interpretation of Thomas precisely because of the construal of 
theological doctrines within a narrowly philosophical perspective.  
 
A good example of such misunderstanding is Garcia’s treatment of Thomas on divine 
law. Garcia links together ‘the divine and human law’ and characterises both as 
‘positive law’ (Garcia, p. 5), that is, written law. He thus identifies the divine law with 
the law given by God to Moses on Mount Sinai, and focally with the Ten 
Commandments. Divine law can thus be thought of as a kind of ‘instruction manual’ 
whose content is derived from ‘the nature of human beings’ i.e. from natural law7. 
However, Thomas himself is clear that the divine law is twofold, the old law given on 
Sinai and the new law of the gospel (S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 91, art. 5; S.T. 1a-2ae, qq.106-
108). And whereas the old law takes the form of positive law (a list of precepts), the 
new law is more internal than external, a matter of the spirit rather than of the letter 
(S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 106, art. 1). In fact, the new law is ‘principally the grace itself of the 
Holy Spirit’ (S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 106, art. 1, corpus). Not only does Garcia fail to bring 
this out, but it is striking that nowhere in his paper does he refer to grace, nor to the 
Holy Spirit. 
 
In this context another perhaps significant omission is Thomas’s claim that the end of 
the divine government is God. Indeed there is a sense in which the eternal law is God: 
‘his [eternal] law is not distinct from himself’ (S.T. 1a-2ae q. 91, art1. ad 3). The 
eternal law exists in the mind of God within which all things are God. This follows 
from the doctrine of divine simplicity (S.T. 1a, q. 3) but it also reflects the claim, 
made elsewhere (S.T. 1a-2ae, qq. 1-5), that complete human fulfilment could consist 
in nothing less than a participation in the life of God. Constantly we encounter within 
the writings of Thomas the themes of grace and beatitude, of the fulfilment which 
comes only as a gift of God and which consists of beatific communion with God. 
However, while they pervade Thomas’s teaching, these themes are routinely 
neglected by those who wish to take from Thomas a method that is purely 
philosophical. Servais Pinckaers (1995: 189-190) has argued convincingly that 
Thomas’s moral teaching is essentially evangelical in character. Thomas’s extensive 
use of Aristotle may have ‘deceived modern readers’ into thinking of him more as an 
Aristotelian than as a Christian, but the core of his moral theology is the grace of the 
Holy Spirit and the theological virtues. 
 
The neglect of the category of grace leads Garcia into a certain degree of confusion in 
explaining what the notion of ‘sin’ adds to that of ‘vice’. Initially he seems to accept 
the definition given by Thomas: sin is an ‘utterance, deed or desire contrary to the 
eternal law’ (Garcia, p. 3). Yet later he states that, ‘what the concept of sin adds to 
that of vice, then, is specific reference to God and to his commands’ (Garcia, p. 14 
emphasis added). At this point Garcia seems to have in mind the revealed commands 
of God, the positive aspect of divine law, for in the same paragraph he states that, ‘sin 
depends on God’s divine (positive) law, which itself follows the natural law rooted in 
our nature’ (Garcia, p. 13). This last quotation is inaccurate in a number of particulars. 
In the first place the definition of sin which Thomas accepts refers immediately not to 
the ‘divine law’, nor to the ‘natural law’, but to acts contrary to the ‘eternal law’, 
which is God himself, and is the measure of the natural and the divine law. In the 
second place, the divine law is not primarily positive law, though it does have an 
aspect of positive law. In the third place, the sinfulness of acts does not depend 
primarily on any positive law but on the fact that vicious acts, of themselves, 
contradict the eternal law. In the fourth place, the divine law does not simply follow 
from ‘the natural law rooted in our nature’ but goes beyond it. 
 
Thomas is clear in a number of places that, unlike human law, divine law is not based 
on human reason nor is it derived from the natural law. It is, rather, a further 
participation in the eternal law that goes beyond the merely natural (S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 
91, art. 4, ad. 3; S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 62, art. 2, resp.; S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 71, art. 6, ad.5). It 
certainly conforms with the natural law, for ‘grace builds upon nature’ (S.T. 1a, q. 1, 
art. 8, ad. 2 and elsewhere), but it adds a new principle of action and provides the 
basis of a new conception of virtue. The ‘theological virtues’ of faith, hope and 
charity are distinct in kind from those virtues based solely in human nature (S.T. 1a-
2ae, q. 62, art. 1). They are given freely by God and are the direct expression of the 
presence of God, the possession of the Holy Spirit, by grace.  
 
The virtues of virtue theory 
 
In general Garcia develops well the idea of acquired virtue8 and shows how it can 
function as a central moral concept. His paper is also interesting in that it relates the 
idea of virtue to that of role-centredness (or, in a medical context, patient-
centredness). This is best done in the extensive footnote 16. Also helpful in this 
context was his analysis of the so call ‘four principles’ of biomedical ethics in terms 
of virtue theory. Much work in this area has already been done by Pellegrino (e.g. 
1985, 1993) to whom Garcia does not refer, but Garcia’s account remains a useful 
sketch of how virtue theory can be relevant to bioethics.  
 
Given this strength, it would have been helpful if Garcia had developed the theme 
further and explored the relationship between the virtues and human life issues9 and, 
more particular, between virtue and suffering10. This latter could have been done 
through an analysis of mercy (misericordia) (S.T. 2a-2ae, q. 30, art. 2) the virtue 
through which one grieves over another’s misfortune. Mercy in this sense, like virtue 
in general, is a mean between two vices. In this case it is a matter of being neither a 
coldly indifferent nor overwhelmed by sentiment. Understanding virtue in this way 
can help protect against emotional burn-out on the part of professionals. Also, it can 
help professionals to take decisions in difficult, emotionally-charged circumstances. It 
is particularly the difficulty of coping with another’s suffering that can lead the 
professional to seek to escape this by cutting short the life of the patient, rather than 
helping the patient live well and as comfortably as possible his or her last remaining 
days. The difficulty of establishing when suffering is to be resisted (as something 
harmful and remediable) and when it is to be accepted (as something useful or 
inevitable) seems to imply that mercy must be guided by practical wisdom. Hence 
Thomas links the beatitude ‘blessed are the merciful’ with the gift of counsel: ‘The 
beatitude of mercy specifically corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but 
as directing mercy’ (S.T. 2a-2ae, q. 52, art. 4). Such an account of the place of virtue 
in coping with suffering would have augmented Garcia’s paper considerably. 
 
An important qualification for Garcia’s account of virtue is that, in the understanding 
of Thomas, the acquired moral virtues need to be informed and directed by the 
theological virtues of faith, hope and love. Furthermore, the moral virtues are thereby 
radically altered. One aspect of this is that love in the Christian sense (caritas) brings 
with it all the virtues. Thus, in the case of the Christian believer, virtues such as 
courage and justice are ‘infused’, given freely by grace rather than being habits built 
up by previous actions. Another aspect is that the characteristic acts of the moral 
virtues are altered. For example, while for Aristotle the archetypal example of courage 
is the soldier nobly facing death for the sake of the city, for Thomas it is the martyr 
patiently enduring death in witness to the gospel (S.T. 2a-2ae, q. 124). Hence also, 
while pride is a virtue for Aristotle (Nicomeachean Ethics II.7) it is a capital sin for 
Thomas (S.T. 2a-2ae, qq. 161-162), for it threatens the fundamental source of virtue, 
which lies outside human capabilities. Finally, even the theological virtues need to be 
completed by the gifts of the Spirit, which are dispositions to be guided by the 
particular promptings of the Holy Spirit (S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 68, art. 2). These are needed 
because the end to which the theological virtues fit us, life in union with God, is 
beyond human understanding. The Christian relies on the particular guidance of the 
Spirit, in addition to the settled dispositions of faith, hope, and love, to bring this life 
to its true end. The overall portrayal of the principles of the Christian life by Thomas 
thus includes not only natural law and natural moral virtues acquired by practice, but 
theological and infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit (to say nothing of the 
beatitudes and the fruits of the Spirit). None of this is evident from Garcia’s paper. 
 
The significance of sin 
 
It is certainly true that Christianity morality should consist in more than a series of 
‘Thou Shalt Nots’ (Garcia, p. 4), and it is also true that sin is ‘secondary’ (Garcia, p. 
7) in a metaphysical sense. In Christianity there is no equality between good and evil, 
God and Satan, grace and sin. Sin is parasitic upon good and can only be understood 
in relation to good11. Nevertheless, especially within the philosophical account of law 
given by Garcia, it is difficult to agree with his assertion that ‘sin is neither central to 
Catholicism’s theoretical understanding of Christian life nor its ethical thought in 
general.’ (Garcia, pp.7-8) A Catholic account of the Christian life requires treating not 
only the natural law and the natural moral virtues, but the grace that justifies sinners. 
Central to the Christian life is the idea of redemption: won by Christ through his life, 
death, and resurrection; participated in by Christians through grace; expressed and 
effected in the sacraments; and inspiring the theological virtues and gifts of the Spirit. 
What account can be given of Calvary and of its sacramental sign, the sacrifice of the 
Eucharist, without reference to human sin and divine reconciliation? How can any 
Catholic moral theologian claim that the need redemption is not ‘central to 
Catholicism’s theoretical understanding of Christian life’? 
 
According to Thomas, the graced principle of action within the heart, the divine law, 
is destroyed by mortal sin, that is, by sin in its primary sense12. Mortal sin is a 
catastrophe because it involves, of itself, the complete loss of the life of grace. It is a 
kind of death of the soul and for that reason it also leads, of itself, to the everlasting 
death of Hell13. There can be repentance and reconciliation after mortal sin, but this is 
possible, not because of a power human beings possess to pick themselves up after 
sinning, but only because of the grace of God which is sent into the heart to inspire 
repentance and to effect reconciliation. Without this special act of God the sinner 
would remain dead in his or her sins14. Garcia alludes to the death of the soul at the 
very end of his paper when quoting Benedict XIV (2005, pp. 151, 152 quoted by 
Garcia, p. 25), but there is nothing in the first half of the paper which would explain 
why sin should have such a terrible consequence. Garcia talks of sin ‘distancing’ the 
sinner from God (Garcia, p. 7), but the idea of distance is relative not absolute, and it 
carries no connotation of the death of the spiritual life as described by Thomas. Hence 
a neglect of the specifically theological aspects of Thomas’s thought leads Garcia to 
understate the radical harm done by sin and the significance if sin (and grace) in the 
Christian life. This is an important issue not simply for the interpretation of Thomas 
but for the understanding of sin in itself and in relation to human suffering. 
 
In the second half of the paper there is an interesting discussion of the importance of 
the category of sin for understanding health and public policy decisions (Garcia, p. 
17), and in his conclusion, Garcia assert that ‘it is at our peril that we delude ourselves 
into believing that we can wish sin away’ (Garcia, p. 24). Nevertheless, there is little 
grounding in the first section of the paper for this important theme. Rather, the weight 
of the first section is to show that sin is not a central concern of Catholic moral 
reflection. If this were indeed the case then it would be difficult to see why an 
acknowledgement of sin should be so important in relation to public health. If, on the 
other hand, Garcia is correct in identifying the acknowledgement of human sinfulness 
as significant for understanding public health policy, then it would seem that sin 
occupies a more significant place in the Christian understanding of the moral life than 
the first half of Garcia’s paper would suggest.  
 
The redemption of suffering  
 
Garcia asserts that ‘Jesus is reported to have explicitly repudiated [the view that] 
human suffering stems from our (or our parents’) sin’ (Garcia, p. 17). He gives no 
reference but probably has in mind the story of the man born blind (John 9.1-41). 
When Jesus is asked whether the man sinned or his parents, he replies, ‘It was not that 
this man sinned, or his parents, but that the works of God might be made manifest in 
him.’ (John 9.3) Nevertheless, while this text has certainly encouraged Christians to 
repudiate too easy a relationship between sin and suffering, this goes beyond what can 
be inferred from this story alone. It may well be that ‘Jesus rejected the 
presuppositions of the view that our own (actual) sins always or usually cause our 
suffering’ (Garcia, p. 17), but all that can be inferred from this particular Gospel story 
is that in this one case the man’s blindness was not caused by sin but was allowed by 
God so that a miracle could be performed. The same explanation clearly does not 
apply to all those whose afflictions are not miraculously healed.  
 
The book of Job also provides a justification for breaking the link between guilt and 
suffering, but again, as with the man born blind, Job could be regarded as an 
exception to the general rule. Certainly Job is exceptional in his uprightness and, 
according to the story, this is the reason why he suffers (Job 1.8). 
 
Another Scriptural story which sheds light on this is in the Gospel according to Luke 
where it is reported that people came to Jesus telling him of terrible events that had 
befallen certain Galileans: Pilate had executed them and mixed their blood with the 
sacrifices. His hearers seem to have attributed these sufferings to the sins of those 
who suffered. Jesus’ reply is instructive: ‘Do you think that these Galileans were 
worse sinners than all the other Galileans, because they suffered thus? I tell you, No; 
but unless you repent you will all likewise perish.’ (Luke 13.2-3) 
 
One should note that Jesus does not deny that these people were sinners; he denies 
that they were worse sinners than other Galileans. Furthermore he warns his audience 
that they will ‘likewise perish’ if they do not repent. So, at some level Jesus does 
affirm the link between guilt and perishing, but it may be that the perishing he has in 
mind is not earthly suffering but the eternal suffering of Hell to which he refers in 
several places. (Matthew 5.22; 7.19; 13.50; 25.41; Mark 9.43; John 15.6) 
 
What is important in the story of the man born blind and of the Galileans killed by 
Pilate is not that suffering cannot be due to sin, but that it is wrong to assume that 
someone who suffers is necessarily a worse sinner than anyone else. This act of 
judging someone else is itself a sin, the sin of self-righteousness. It is for this that 
comforters of Job are condemned by God (Job 42.7) and that the Pharisees who 
charge the blind man with sin are condemned by Jesus (John 9.41). This is important 
to bear in mind while affirming with Garcia the roots of much ill-health in human sin 
and ‘irresponsible conduct and habits’. The Philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe once 
remarked (1981:92), in a different context, that Christian teaching ‘ought absolutely 
not to be irrelevant to the unhappy and flattering to the lucky’. The danger of 
associating ill-health too easily with sin is it seems to blame those who suffer more 
and exonerate those who suffer less, while the latter may not be any holier than the 
former. They may simply be luckier.  
 
Even where good health is due to hard work and virtuous living, the virtues of self-
control this implies are not the highest (theological) virtues. Furthermore, they may 
even be the occasion of the sin of pride, through which love would be lost so that the 
self-discipline that remained would no longer be accounted a true virtue. This danger 
lies behind Augustine’s concern for those who have taken religious vows, ‘Give me 
one who makes profession of perpetual continence, and who is free from… all such 
faults and spots of conduct; for this one I fear pride, for this so great good I am in 
alarm from the swelling of arrogance’ (On holy virginity 34). 
 
Augustine is concerned due to his theology of grace (later taken up by Thomas 
Aquinas) according to which salvation comes from God and must be received with 
humility. The sins against which every Christian struggles cause much of the 
suffering in the world, including the suffering of disease and disability. Nevertheless, 
the link between sin and suffering is not primarily individual, for many suffer as a 
result of the sins of others. Suffering is very often the result of structures of sin that 
are not easily eradicated from society. Thus we must carefully qualify the assertion of 
Garcia that ‘it is at our peril that we delude ourselves into believing that we can wish 
sin away by reconceiving its manifestations and effects as mere matters for improved 
‘public health’ policies.’ (Garcia, p. 24) From a Christian perspective, the recognition 
of sin can only be fruitful if it is informed by the virtue of mercy and the hope of 
redemption. The reality of sin, which must be taken into account in working for all 
aspects of the common good, including public health, will include the self-
righteousness of the strong (and the lucky) as well as the self-indulgence of the weak. 
A danger of relating sin and suffering without first giving an account of grace, is that 
virtue is conflated with good habits, and those who suffer from poor education and 
dehumanising circumstances are too easily blamed for their ills.  
 An unhappy separation 
 
The two halves of Garcia’s paper are oddly isolated from one another. The first half 
utilises Thomas Aquinas to provide a synthesis of natural law and virtue theory, but 
contains no discussion of grace and little discussion of sin. The second half begins 
with a discussion of sin and suffering but contains no reference to Thomas and seems 
to have little connection with the preceding section. Rather, it seems to begin afresh. 
It does not refer back to the philosophical discussion in the first half of the paper, but 
instead makes extensive use of the work of John Paul II, in particular Salvifici 
Doloris.  
 
This is very difficult material and it is hard to reconcile some of the pope’s 
statements, for example his assertion that suffering is due to evil, ‘which is a certain 
lack, limitation or distortion of good’ (1984:7, quoted by Garcia p. 13) is in tension 
with his claim later in Salvifici Doloris that suffering ‘is something good, before 
which the Church bows down in reverence’ (1984:24, not quoted by Garcia). A 
relative lack of structure in Garcia’s discussion, in addition to a certain reticence in 
commentary, does not help the reader to resolve these points of tension or to engage 
more deeply with the thought of John Paul II in this area. In relation to Salvifici 
Doloris it is better to go directly to the original than to struggle unnecessarily with 
Garcia’s reworking.  
 
As it stands Garcia’s paper refers to Thomas Aquinas eighteen times in the 
philosophical first part but not at all in the theological second part. This creates an 
unhappy division between philosophy and theology of a sort that Thomas himself 
would not have recognised. It generates a portrayal of Thomas that is too 
philosophical and a theological discussion that does not benefit from the clarity 
Thomas would bring. More light could have been shed on this subject by turning to 
writers such as Gerald Vann who, in The Divine Pity, develops an insight of Thomas 
on the relationship of mercy and counsel. ‘The gift of counsel is concerned with the 
choice of means to the desired end… Pain is an effect of evil; it can also be a means 
of good; but if you make it not a means but an end you deny the nature of God, and 
blaspheme.’ (Vann 1946:117-118) Vann is conscious of the real tension that exists 
here and seeks to explore it within the theological framework provided by Thomas 
Aquinas. If Garcia had followed others such as Vann or McCabe, and had turned to 
Thomas for a theological account of the meaning of suffering, it would have provided 
a strong link between the two halves of his paper. This would have required an 
integration of philosophical and theological thinking of a kind that is by no means 
easy to achieve. Nevertheless, to address such deep and perennial questions, it is 
precisely such an integrated Christian approach that is needed.  
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conceiving of charity as a virtue, in the sense which Garcia gives that term, relies on a later tradition, 
on Augustine to some extent, but more particularly on Thomas Aquinas 
3 Garcia, p.5 drawing on S.T. 1a-2ae, qq. 90-97. 
4 Plato Euthyphro 11b; see Mouw 1998. 
5 Garcia, p. 6, though it is noticeable that in the footnote, Garcia defends this assertion not with any 
reference to the works of Thomas but with a reference to the Catechism of the Catholic Church. 
6 For criticism of this conception see e.g. Davies 1985:151-154, 212-216. 
7 Garcia, p. 6. This is an analogy familiar from children’s catechesis e.g. Johnson 1998; Bebbington 
1986; Double 1994, and thus the criticisms that are levelled at it in this paper have implications for 
Christian education 
8 For his treatment of virtue-theory Garcia draws upon the thought of Thomas Aquinas, though Garcia 
develops it in his own way. When discussing the definition of virtue, Garcia is correct to say that 
Thomas follows Peter Lombard’s definition: ‘a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly and 
which no one uses badly, [and] that God alone works in man’ (Garcia, note 6). However, while Garcia 
complains that some translations have ‘maddeningly’ translated the last clause as ‘that God works 
within us without us’, the Latin of this phrase (Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur) means precisely this. 
This is evident from S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 55, art. 4 where Thomas admits that this definition, as it stands, 
does not apply to naturally acquired virtues but only to infused virtues. It seems again that inaccuracy 
in Garcia’s reading of Thomas (in this case, his preference for a less faithful translation) stems from a 
neglect of the categories of grace and infused virtue.  
Garcia could also be charged with optimism in thinking that, apart from its Christian forms, virtue 
theory necessarily has an advantage over principlism of making it ‘more difficult to justify’ actions 
such as ‘abortion and mercy-killings’. It should be remembered that Aristotle, esteemed as the father of 
virtue ethics, was in favour of both abortion and infanticide: ‘As to the exposure and rearing of 
children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live, but that on the ground of an excess in the 
number of children, if the established customs of the state forbid this (for in our state population has a 
limit), no child is to be exposed, but when couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured 
before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the 
question of life and sensation’ (Politics 7:16). 
9 As Cessario (1989) does. 
10 As I attempt to do in Jones (1999). 
11 Given that Garcia approaches the first part of this paper from a philosophical perspective, drawing 
heavily on the thought of Thomas Aquinas, it is surprising that he neglects any discussion of the nature 
of evil or badness, except indirectly in his quotation from John Paul II (Garcia p. 19). Thomas is well 
known for having developed Augustine’s account of evil as a privation of good, and this account acts 
as a foundation for what he says about moral evil, vice, sin and suffering. See Augustine Confessions 
VII; City of God XI. 22; Thomas Aquinas S. T. 1a, qq. 48-49, McCabe (2005), Davies (1985), Jones 
(1999). For criticism of this kind of approach to theodicy see Hauerwas (1990). 
12 S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 71, art. 4; S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 88, art. 1. It is noteworthy that, while Garcia refers to ‘actual 
sin’, ‘habitual sin’ and ‘original sin’ (Garcia, p. 13) he makes no mention of ‘mortal sin’. 
13 S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 87, art. 3; for sin as a kind of death see also Augustine City of God XIII.1-15. 
14 S.T. 1a-2ae, q. 109 art. 7; on repentance as raising the dead again see also, for example, Augustine 
Tractates on John’s Gospel 49. 
